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Few principles are more fundamentally important to modern
society than duty. As obligation to oneself and others-to one's
family, friends, neighbors, business associates, clients, customers,
community, nation, and God-duty is the thread that binds humans
to the world, to the communities in which they live. Duty constrains
and channels human behavior in a socially responsible way before
the fact, and it provides a basis for judging the propriety of behav-
ior thereafter. Duty flows from millennia of social customs, philoso-
phy, and religion. And duty is the overarching concept of the law.
Duty is central to the law of torts. Negligence law divides
human choices to engage in (or refrain from) foreseeably harmful
conduct as proper or improper, and choices are adjudged improper
only if they involve a breach of duty. Thus, serving as the founda-
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tional element of a negligence claim, duty provides the front door to
recovery for the principal cause of action in the law of torts: On the
way to possible redress, every negligence claim must pass through
the duty portal that bounds the scope of tort recovery for accidental
harm. Yet in the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Princi-
ples,' duty rules lie muffled, embedded in the negligence cause of
action but excluded from recognition as a formal element.
Assessing whether the Restatement adequately describes the
role of duty in the law of negligence requires study of two signifi-
cant works of scholarship: a "discussion draft" of many basic negli-
gence law principles in the Restatement (Third), authored by Re-
porter Gary Schwartz, 2 and an important article by Professors John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law. 3 The draft Restatement's formula-
tion of the negligence cause of action excludes duty as a black-letter
element in the formal definition, ignoring its conventional position
as the initial element of such claims. Decrying the relegation of
duty to secondary status, Goldberg and Zipursky challenge the
draft Restatement's failure to capture duty's vital role in the vast
majority of American jurisdictions in which it is the threshold ele-
ment of the tort of negligence. 4
This Essay briefly examines the role of duty in negligence
law and the rules that define that role. The debate over how the
Restatement (Third) should treat the duty concept is at once concep-
tual, doctrinal, and practical. The strength accorded the duty/no-
duty issue is conceptually important because it defines the extent to
which the law of torts holds people accountable for their damaging
misdeeds. In duty rulings, negligence law balances the interests of
certain classes of potential victims in security from certain types of
1. Unless otherwise noted, references herein to drafts of the Restatement are to the Restate.
ment (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft) CDiscussion Draft). The title of the
Restatement project has now changed to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm
(Basic Principles). See Calendar of Meetings (ALI & ALI-ABA, Jan. 8, 2001).
2. Appointed in 1996, Professor Schwartz was the sole original Reporter of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: General Principles and was the sole author of the Discussion Draft, which con-
tains the most recent formulation of the duty rules discussed herein. Serving briefly as a co-
Reporter in 2000, Professor Harvey Perlman prepared for discussion purposes a formulation of
the duty concept that was quite different from that set forth by Professor Schwartz. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Preliminary Draft No. 2, May 10, 2000)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2]. Later in the year, Professor Perlman's academic obliga-
tions precluded him from continuing work on the project, and Professor Michael Green was ap.
pointed to serve as co-Reporter to Professor Schwartz.
3. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Third Restatement and the Place of
Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001).
4. Id. at 658-60.
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harm against certain interests of certain classes of actors in free-
dom of action. This balance of interests controls the extent to which
courts close the door on major types of problems lying at the edge of
tort law or pass these border problems through to juries for pre-
liminary determination. Once the proper role of duty in negligence
law is resolved conceptually, duty and no-duty rules must be for-
mulated for use by judges, jurors, and lawyers counseling actors
and victims. How strongly duty rules are defined will control the
extent to which negligence lawsuits of various types are allowed to
proceed or are summarily ejected from the judicial system. In short,
weaker no-duty rules funnel more disputes at the margin of negli-
gence law into local courtrooms for redress while stronger no-duty
rules force the victims of such disputes to seek relief from institu-
tions other than the courts, such as from private and public insur-
ance.
Exploring the tug between strong and weak duty rules, this
Essay concludes that duty is properly conceived as the primary
element of a negligence claim, a position of importance that the
draft Restatement fails almost entirely to capture. Although duty's
strength in most negligence cases lies embedded and untapped, it
contains a robust power that, like a sleeping giant, often must be
called upon at the margin of the law of torts to determine the
proper scope of this area of the law. Duty rules, this Essay con-
cludes, should reflect this vital fact.
I. DUTY RULES IN NEGLIGENCE LAW
A. In General
Duty has always been the central glue of law. But the term
"duty," like "negligence," has evolved in meaning and still today is
understood in different ways. 5 Indeed, two different meanings of
"negligence" help explain the current debate on the role of duty in
negligence law. Until the negligence cause of action began to de-
velop during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 6
the term negligence was used loosely to describe unlawful
5. See generally Percy FL Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L REV. 41
(1934) (exploring the meaning of duty and its origins as a requisite for liability in negligence to
determine whether it serves a "useful function"). On the differing meanings of"dut 5y. see Gold-
berg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 661-62, 666-67.
6. See Winfield, supra note 5, at 49.
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behavior. 7 Once the negligence cause of action arose, "negligence"
took on another meaning-a tort8 defined by four (or five) elements:
duty, breach, cause (including cause in fact and proximate cause),
and damage. 9 In this classic definition of the tort of negligence, duty
sits at the front of the list of elements. Yet, consistent with its his-
torical origins and lay usage, "negligence" is commonly understood
as well to denote merely the second element of the negligence cause
of action-breach (of duty). In this second usage, negligence is often
defined in terms of failing to exercise reasonable care, or something
similar. This misconduct definition of negligence-as-behavior is no
less correct than the definition of the tort of negligence, but the
narrower concept it describes is merely a member of the set of ele-
ments that comprise negligence in its broader cause of action form.
Like negligence, the term "duty" also has two basic mean-
ings, one broad and the other narrow. 10 Over the millennia, from at
least the time of ancient Rome, "duty" was broadly understood to
mean legal obligation." In the late nineteenth century, Oliver
Wendell Holmes viewed law generally in this manner as an expres-
sion of various duties. 12 In this broad sense, "duty" may be con-
ceived as the equivalent of "law." From this perspective, duty is the
7. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 28, at 160-61 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS].
8. Negligence is now the "dominant cause of action for accidental injury in this nation to-
day." Id. at 161.
9. See id. § 30, 164-65 (specifying four elements of the prima facie case for negligence,
combining cause in fact and proximate causation); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at
269 (2000) (specifying five elements, separating the two causation elements), Defining negli-
gence in terms of these elements is long established. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1022 (1928) (setting forth four elements).
10. In addition to the two basic meanings of duty, there are others. See PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 53, at 356-58; Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 3, at 692-97.
11. While the Roman law of delict bore little resemblance to modern tort law, the modern
concept of duty in tort law may be loosely traced to the Roman law of obligations, which included
both tort and contract law. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR
RELATION TO MODERN LAW 386-545 (1938).
12. For Holmes' rather strained attempt to understand all of law in terms of duty, see
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870), reprinted
in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725, 727 (1931), and The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873), reprinted
in 44 HARv. L. REV. 773, 781-84 (1931). But see Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 471-72 (1897) (reasoning that general tort responsibility is subject to limita-
tions on "special grounds of policy," but refusing to formalize this "tendency" in terms of correla-
tive rights and duties). Other early tort law commentators viewed tort law broadly in terms of
breach of duty. See, e.g., CHARLES A. RAY, MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 1, 4-5 (8th ed. 1907); NEGLIGENCE OF IMPOSED DUTIES, PERSONAL (1891).
770
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flip side of right,13 and the two define the realm of freedoms-of ac-
tion and security-possessed by persons of conflicting interests in
society.14 In early English law, duties related to what we now call
tort law were defined with some particularity by forms of action
specifying certain obligations of persons involved in public callings,
public office, bailments, and in controlling dangerous things. 15 As a
cause of action for negligence developed during the nineteenth cen-
tury, common law judges sought a source for legal obligation, turn-
ing both to contract'6 and to statute, 17 and only slowly, and for want
of a firmer base, to the common law.
Duty did not emerge as a "consciously technical term" in the
common law of negligence until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury.18 The fountainhead case in which duty became "firmly fixed 19
in negligence law was Heaven v. Pender,20 decided by the British
Court of Appeal in 1883. A ship painter was injured in the collapse
of a defective scaffold supplied by the owner of the dock where the
ship was located. The painter brought a negligence action against
the dock owner who defended the case on the principle of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright, contending that it had no duty to the plaintiff be-
cause its only contract was with the ship owner with whom the
13. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JUIUSPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1869), reprinted in
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 455 n.6 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) (stating that "a duty without a
correlative claim (or right) is impossible and, therefore, unthinkable") (quoting Kocourek, Ana-
lytic Jurisprudence Since John Austin, in 2 LAW-A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 201 (1937)); BIGELOW,
supra note 12, at 36 (noting that "whether we speak of the breach, by the defendant, of the plain-
tiffs right, or of the defendant's duty to respect that right, it comes to the same thing; the breach
by the defendant of the plaintiffs legal right is a breach of the defendant's duty"); George W.
Goble, A Definition of Basic Legal Terms, 35 COLUM. L REV. 535 (1935) (discussing the right-
duty relation in the Hohfeldian system of juristic terminology), reprinted in READINGS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 509, 520-21; Henry T. Terry, Duties, Rights and Wrongs, 10 A.B.A. J.
123 (1924), reprinted in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 460 (fVhen one person is sub-
ject to a duty to another to do or not to do a certain act, that other has a right to have the act
done or not done."). For a more recent example, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
167 (1986) ("Rights are grounds of duties in others.!).
14. See, e.g., Winfield, supra note 5, at 42-43 (citing 1 THOMAS BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW
7-8 (4th ed. 1928)). See generally ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 126 (1997) (noting that
"both risk-creators and risk-receivers bear a complement of rights and duties"). The right-duty
linkage is closely connected to Professor Veinrib's rigorous model of corrective justice as featur-
ing an intrinsic moral connection between the doing and suffering of harm. See Ernest J. Wein-
rib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 145-70 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54
VAND. L. REV. 803,805-06 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Winfield, supra note 5, at 44-49.
16. The classic case in which duty in negligence law was thought to rest on contract was
Winterbottorn v. Wright, 10 M & NV. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
17. See Winfield, supra note 5, at 56-57.
18. Id. at 65. Its emergence has been characterized as "a historical accident." Id. at 66.
19. Id. at 57.
20. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
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plaintiffs employer contracted to paint the ship. Reversing the Di-
visional Court,21 the Court of Appeal allowed the claim. Noting that
the defendant had not contested its carelessness in allowing the
scaffolding to fall into disrepair, Brett, M.R., observed that "want of
attention amounting to a want of ordinary care is not a good cause
of action, although injury ensue from such want, unless the person
charged with such want of ordinary care had a duty to the person
complaining to use ordinary care in respect of the matter called in
question."22 As to the kind of circumstances that would give rise to
such a duty, Brett, M.R., broadly observed in a renowned passage:
The proposition ... is that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such
a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to
avoid such danger.23
So stated, the duty element of the negligence cause of action is
commensurate with the reach of the second, negligence-as-breach
(misconduct) element of the cause of action. Under this view, con-
duct would be a breach of duty simply if it exposed a foreseeable
plaintiff to a foreseeable risk of harm. In both law and ethics, it is
of course fundamental that conduct posing no foreseeable risks of
harm cannot be blamed. 24 But the converse is not always true: Neg-
ligently harming foreseeable victims does not always give rise to a
negligence cause of action. Duty is a much richer notion than fore-
seeability, and Heaven v. Pender's implication that a person's duty
to exercise due care is limited only by foreseeability is simply
wrong. The approach of Brett, M.R., in Heaven v. Pender would
transform duty into a hollow shell, a useless element of the negli-
gence cause of action which mischievously would require courts and
juries to reexamine in the second (negligence-as-misconduct) ele-
21. Heaven v. Pender, 9 Q.B.D. 302 (1882).
22. Heaven, 11 Q.B. at 507. Brett, M.R., continued:
Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill
towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary
care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff, without contributory negligence
on his part, has suffered injury to his person or property.
Id.
23. Id. at 509.
24. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd., A.C. 388, 423
(P.C. 1961) ('Wagon Mound No. 1") ('It is a principle of civil liability.., that a man must be
considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is
too harsh a rule ....").
[Vol. 54:3:767
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ment issues already examined and resolved in the first. But even
Brett, M.R. (Lord Esher, after obtaining a peerage), in time ap-
peared to acquire a stronger view of the role of duty.26
Once negligence law substantially took shape during the
nineteenth century, courts and commentators began to recognize
the important function of the duty/no-duty element as a limitation
on the types of cases for which the negligence cause of action was
appropriate.2 7 Among the many recurring categories of cases in
which courts have come to understand that negligent conduct (neg-
ligence-as-breach) should not always give rise to liability, even
when the plaintiff and the risk were both entirely foreseeable, are
claims involving injuries to third persons (by manufacturers,2 pro-
fessionals,2 9  employers, 30  social hosts providing guests with
alcohol, 31 and probation officers 32), harm to unborn plaintiffs,33 non-
feasance (involving the extent of a duty to rescue or otherwise af-
firmatively to act),3 4 landowner liability (to trespassers and other
uninvited guests), 35 and damage to nonphysical interests (especially
25. For an early recognition of the weaknesses in Brett, I.lMs approach in Heaven, see 1
THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABIL1TY 94 (1906) (-There is something
essentially strained and artificial in the conception of a duty to use care to avoid harm as regards
the world... ."). Percy Winfield questioned the usefulness of a formal duty notion, Winfield,
supra note 5, at 43 & 58-66, but he concluded that it had become too deeply ingrained in the law
simply to expunge. Id. at 66.
26. See Lane v. Cox, 1 Q.B. 415, 417 (1897) CA person cannot be held liable for negligence
unless he owed some duty to the plaintiff and that duty was neglected."); see also Ie Lievre v.
Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893) C'A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the
whole world if he owes no duty to them.").
27. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, ch. 9 (examining established
no-duty categories of negligence law).
28. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that manu-
facturer of prescription drug has no duty to warn ultimate purchaser in addition to physician).
29. See, e.g., Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp., 513 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Ill. 1987) (ruling that hospi-
tal and doctors had no duty to third party (passenger of car), injured as a result of defendants'
failure to warn patient (driver), not to drink and drive after taking prescribed drug).
30. See, e.g., Homer v. Pabst Brewing Co., 806 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
defendant employer had no duty to truck driver injured by defendant's employee driving home ill
from work).
31. See, e.g., Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153, 158 (W. Va. 1990) (ruling that so-
cial host who provides liquor to guest has no duty to third parties injured by intoxicated driving
of former guest).
32. See, e.g., Lamb v. Hopkins, 492 A.2d 1297, 1305-06 (Mi. 1985) (holding that probation
officer had no duty to third parties to prevent probationer from driving under the influence).
33. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906.07 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that there is
no duty under wrongful death act to avoid negligently killing fetuses of pregnant woman in-
volved in car accident).
34. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (finding no duty to rescue
drowning person who jumped into pit of water).
35. See, e.g., Wolfv. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 697 A.2d 1082, 1086 (R.I. 1997) (ruling that
landowner has no duty of reasonable care toward trespassers).
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emotional harm36 and pure economic loss 37). In contexts such as
these, where the appropriateness of allowing recovery under the
law of negligence is unclear, twentieth century courts came to rec-
ognize the importance of duty's threshold, gatekeeper role.
38
B. The Ebb and Flow of Duty
Until about 1960, courts closely guarded the house of negli-
gence from various types of intrusion by large categories of foresee-
able victims across the realm of accident law, from medical patients
and land entrants to victims of product accidents and guest passen-
gers in automobiles. One simple example that barred large catego-
ries of negligence claims in both landowner and products liability
cases was the obvious danger rule: Landowners3 9 and manufactur-
ers40 simply had no duty, even if they were careless toward foresee-
able land entrants and consumers, to act with reasonable care to
protect such persons from harm from obviously dangerous condi-
tions. Through rigorously applied no-duty rules, courts closely con-
trolled what categories of defendants, plaintiffs, wrongdoing, and
damages would be cognizable under the law of negligence. Doctors
and other professionals were subjected to liability only for the
clearest affirmative failures of professional responsibility; third
parties, no matter how foreseeable, often were deemed outside neg-
ligence doctrine; and the damages branch of negligence found little
room for emotional distress or pure economic loss.
During the expansionary phase of tort law, beginning
roughly in 1960 (the year John F. Kennedy was elected President),
duty limitations were increasingly shoved aside as political power
shifted from actors (often institutions, professionals, and landown-
ers) to victims. 41 For example, during this period courts imposed
36. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (en bane) (ruling that, with
certain exceptions, there is no duty to protect bystanders against negligently inflicted emotional
distress).
37. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MNV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (refusing to allow recovery under tort in absence of physical damage to a proprietary
interest).
38. See generally PROSSER& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, ch. 9.
39. See, e.g., Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789-90 (Wyo. 1982) (ruling that long-
standing "obvious danger no-duty" rule is not abrogated by adoption of comparative negligence).
40. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950) (holding that manufacturers
have no duty to guard against obvious product dangers).
41. This development is ably chronicled in Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possi-
ble End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992). This expansionary
[Vol. 54:3:767774
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duties on doctors for wrongful birth42 and for providing patients
with informed consent, 43 strengthened the duties owed by owners
and occupiers of land to persons entering the premises, 44 and aban-
doned the impact doctrine as a limitation on recovery for emotional
distress. 45 But the largest breach in the duty dam lay in the law of
products liability, where tort law in the 1960s appeared to jettison
foreseeability itself as a limiting factor to recovery in the doctrine of
"strict" products liability in tort.46 This populist widening of the
gates of tort law, of course, was accomplished by narrowing the role
of duty as an exclusionary device and returning to Brett, M.R.'s
broad vision of duty as limited only by, and hence coincident with,
the doctrine of foreseeability. With few exceptions, 47 the commenta-
tors applauded or at least accepted the legitimacy of these expan-
sionary developments, and the trampling of the duty limitation that
they necessarily entailed.
48
Coincident with the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presi-
dency in 1980, the expansionary period of tort law came to a rather
screeching halt. Courts and commentators increasingly began to
recognize the perils of the previous generation's failure to focus on
the proper limits of tort law-on its failure to understand that tort
law, like almost everything, is an evil in excess. 49 Providing limita-
tions on the reach of negligence and other types of tort claims is of
course the basic office of the duty/no-duty concept, so that the be-
ginning point of duty's resurgence may itself be fairly dated at
about 1980. An important early example of this development was
the New Jersey Supreme Court's repudiation, in 1984, of the idea
that foreseeability should be excluded as a limiting principle under
the doctrine of "strict" products liability in tort.&o Transformed vir-
period of tort law was marked by "duty skepticism," an apt term coined by Professors Goldberg
and Zipursky. Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 3, at 692-97.
42. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (N.J. 1979).
43. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
45. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So. 2d 69, 72-73 (Miss. 1980).
46. This story is recounted in detail in 1 DAvID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWIEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW §§ 10:4-10:8 (3d ed. 2000).
47. Most explicitly decrying the breakdown of duty-limitation doctrine during this period
was James A. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept- Retreat Front the Rule of Law, 51
IND. U-J. 467 (1976).
48. An examination of any random selection of the academic literature of the late 1960s and
1970s illustrates this point.
49. See David G. Owen, Respect for Law and Man: The Tort Law of Chief Justice Frank
Rowe Kenison, 11 VT. L. REV. 389, 407 (1986).
50. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984) (holding that a manu-
facturer of pharmaceutical drugs has no duty to warn of unforeseeable risks). Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories effectively overruled Beshada v,. Johns-Man, ille Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539
20011 775
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tually overnight from leading the nation's expansion of tort law to
leading its retreat, 51 the California Supreme Court in 1989 clamped
down on the scope of recovery for third-party emotional distress,
converting its broad foreseeability guidelines into a crystallized
rule of law.52 During the 1980s and 1990s, in one context after an-
other, courts increasingly turned away from simple foreseeability to
some enriched version of duty in helping decide the proper limits on
tort responsibility. As the twentieth century drew to a close, the
increasing control by no-duty and limited-duty principles over the
reach of tort law was widely, although by no means universally,
endorsed by the commentators.
5 3
So, what is the proper role of the duty concept in tort law,
expansionary or restrictive? Does the juxtaposition of conflicting
phases of tort law development-the expansionary period of 1960-
1980 and the contracting period of 1980-2000-reveal that duty
rules are so fickle, unprincipled, and incoherent that the duty ele-
ment is incapable of providing a meaningful gate-keeping role? Any
answer to this question must recognize that duty, much like proxi-
mate cause, 54 is enormously rich, so rich that a judge (or commenta-
tor) not equipped with a well-ordered box of jurisprudential tools
can assign this tort law element either an expansionary or a re-
strictive role.
Depending on the issue, duty determinations may call upon
every possible reason of fairness, justice, and social policy. The
words of one court mirror the thoughts of many others:
An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a statement that two parties
stand in such relationship that the law will impose on one a responsibility for the
exercise of care toward the other. Inherent in this simple description are various
(N.J. 1982), which had held that manufacturers of asbestos products have a duty to warn of
unforeseeable risks. The California Supreme Court followed the Feldman approach in Brown v.
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (pharmaceutical drugs), and extended the principle to
products generally in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 555 (Cal. 1991)
(asbestos products).
51. See generally, Schwartz, supra note 41 (providing a review of these developments).
52. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (holding that, in order
to recover for third party emotional distress, a plaintiff must (1) be closely related to injury vic-
tim; (2) be present at the scene of injury-producing event; and (3) suffer serious emotional dis-
tress). Abandoning foreseeability guidelines in favor of duty rules, the court remarked: "Experi-
ence has shown that ... there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and
thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially
acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury." Id. at 830.
53. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703 (1992); William Powers, Jr.,
Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (1997).
54. "Proximate cause" is used here in the narrow sense of legal cause, as opposed to cause in
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and sometimes delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the activity out of
which the injury arises, compared with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind
of person with whom the actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, espe-
cially in terms of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of prevent-
ing injury; the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury
and the availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; the body
of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties' relationship; the pro-
phylactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a public agency defendant, the
extent of its powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed
upon it by budget; and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share ith
their fellow citizens-such are the factors which play a role in the determination of
duty.55
Yet, as broad and disparate as are the relevant considerations, duty
determinations are not discretionary tools for judges to decide how
wide or narrow the law of negligence should be based upon their
personal predilections. Instead, duty judgments, rendered on a
categorical (rather than case-specific) basis,56 should rest upon a
solid jurisprudential foundation constructed on ordered principles
of law. Duty has an internal moral compass that, on the one hand,
defines certain harmful behavior as wrong, but which, on the other,
defines other harmful behavior as lawful and beyond the proper
reach of law. Thus, duty in the abstract is neither expansionary nor
restrictive; its realm in every instance rests upon a deliberative
balance of the relevant, oft-competing considerations. In practice,
however, duty's function is principally restrictive or exclusionary in
that it defines the scope and outer limits of the law of negligence; in
other words, it provides in other words, negligence law with bor-
ders.
During periods of duty skepticism, courts have sometimes at-
tempted to replace duty with one of two surrogates for limiting re-
covery in negligence law: foreseeability or proximate cause. While
both of these concepts also properly limit the scope of negligence
law, neither fulfills the office of duty. The proper function of the
doctrine of proximate cause involves a morass of complex considera-
tions beyond the scope of the present Essay, and its role and scope
is treated elsewhere in this Symposium. 57 Suffice it here to provide
summaries of two related explanations for why duty should be kept
55. Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
56. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. h.
57. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1011 (2001) (providing substantial examination of proximate cause); Patrick J.
Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximnate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule of Law, 54 VAN. L. REv. 1039 (2001) (same); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact
and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941 (2001) (same); Richard W.
Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush. Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal
Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001) (same).
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distinct from proximate cause, for why the functions of these two
separate elements of the law of negligence should not be conflated.
First is the basic difference in the functions served by these two
doctrines, both of limitation and exclusion but of quite different
types. Courts apply duty rules (as a matter of law) to exclude negli-
gence claims when basic moral values and social policies dictate
that actors, at a categorical level, ought not be subject to the nor-
mal reach of negligence responsibility. By contrast, juries decide (as
a matter of fact) whether a particular breach of duty (once the court
has determined that such a duty did exist) was associated closely
enough with the plaintiffs particular harm to render it fair, under
the particular circumstances of the case, to hold the defendant re-
sponsible for the loss. 58 Second, to heap the heavy load of "special
problems of principle and policy" involved in duty decision making
upon the "proximity" issue, which frequently is overburdened with
its own morass of fairness problems, would result in a confusing
(and unnecessary) mix of category apples with particular oranges.
Not infrequently in the expansionary period of tort law dur-
ing 1960-1980, courts subtly turned to foreseeability as a silent sur-
rogate for duty.59 No doubt, foreseeability is a fundamentally impor-
tant factor in limiting tort responsibility to losses for which actors
are morally responsible. In general, actors are morally accountable
only for risks of harm they do or reasonably should contemplate at
the time of acting, for the propriety of an actor's choices may be
fairly judged only upon the facts and reasons that were or should
have been within the actor's possession at the time the choice was
made. If an actor causes harm of a type or to a person outside the
orbit of reasonable prevision, 60 the unforeseeable results are not
attributable to the actor's will. In situations of this kind, the actor
cannot be blamed for the harmful consequences of the act. So, fore-
seeabiity, a key component of both negligence-as-breach (negligent
behavior) and proximate causation, is a crucial limitation on the
negligence cause of action.
58. Professor Leon Green was particularly concerned with, and best explained, these re-
spective roles of judge and jury in adjudicating duty and proximate cause. See Leon Green, The
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 562-72 (1962); Leon Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, passim (1928); Leon Green, Foresee.
ability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-20 (1961).
59. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924-25 (Cal. 1968) (replacing no-duty rule for
emotional distress of bystanders outside the zone of danger with flexible foreseeability guide-
lines).




Notwithstanding the necessity of foreseeability as a limita-
tion on responsibility for the harmful consequences of negligent acts
and omissions, the foreseeability of a risk and plaintiff is not itself
a sufficient basis for liability in every case. That is, "special prob-
lems of principle or policy" may "justify the withholding of liability"
in certain cases. 61 By way of example, whether a social host who
provides a guest with "too much" alcohol before the guest attempts
to drive home should be subject to negligence responsibility for an
ensuing automotive accident is a question that courts (or legisla-
tures) can best decide as a general rule, rather than permitting,
indeed requiring, juries on an ad hoc basis to make such fundamen-
tal judgments about the propriety of this recurring form of complex
social behavior. 62 As another example, a jury in a particular case
might (or might not) consider it "negligent" for a check casher 63 or
fast-food restaurant employee 64 to fail to surrender money de-
manded by a gunman threatening a hostage, but courts can proba-
bly better decide on a category basis whether the property interests
of enterprises, together with society's interests in discouraging hos-
tage taking, properly may be subordinated to the safety interests of
hostages. As a final example, whether a passer-by should be subject
to negligence liability for failing to help a stranger avoid injury (ei-
ther an initial injury or aggravation) classically illustrates the
kinds of global issues that courts, through duty rules, may properly
decide to exclude in general from jury consideration. 65 Harm in all
such cases is clearly foreseeable, but the kinds of choices among
fundamental values and policies lurking within these types of cases
suggest that courts should be able to determine, as a matter of legal
principle, that defendants in such situations should be exempt from
the normal reach of negligence claims. And duty rules do just that.
61. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6.
62. See, e.g., Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153, 158 (%V. Va. 1990) (holding that so-
cial host who provides liquor to guest has no duty to third parties injured by intoxicated driving
of former guest).
63. See Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 306 N.E.2d 39, 42 (IMI. 1973) (holding that
there was no duty to patron to comply with robber's demands).
64. See, e.g., Ky. Fried Chicken of CaL., Inc. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal.
1997) (rejecting claim that restaurant owed duty to patron to comply with robbers demands).
65. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that there was no duty to
rescue drowning person who jumped into pit of water, even where defendant's taunting moti-
vated decedent to make the jump).
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II. DUTY RULES IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
A. The Restatement (Third)
The draft of the Restatement (Third) fails to include duty as
an explicit element in its definition of the negligence cause of ac-
tion, but it does separately recognize duty's role as an important, if
"unusual," limitation on the reach of negligence. In order to under-
stand the duty section, the draft of the Restatement's structure
must first be considered. The draft classifies tort liability according
to the traditional tripartite division based on the culpability of the
actor: Chapter 1 concerns Intent and Recklessness; 66 Chapter 2 ad-
dresses Negligence and Negligence Liability;67 and Chapter 3 covers
Strict Liability.68 While issues of duty are sprinkled throughout
Chapter 2,69 and while treatment of nonfeasance and the duty of
affirmative action is postponed until later in the Restatement, the
two provisions that most directly involve the role of duty are sec-
tions 3 and 6. Section 3 ("Negligence Liability") provides in full: "An
actor is subject to liability for negligent conduct that is a legal
cause of physical harm."70 And Section 6, entitled "Duty," provides:
Even if the defendant's negligent conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiffs physi-
cal harm, the [defendant] is not liable for that harm if the court determines that
the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. Findings of no duty are unusual, and
are based on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that jus-
tify the withholding of liability.
7 '
The formulations of Sections 3 and 6 are what the duty de-
bate is all about. Section 3 is significant for the glaring absence of
any reference to duty in its black-letter definition of the negligence
cause of action as Negligence-Cause-Damage. However, comment a
does provide: "The language of 'subject to liability' acknowledges
the possibility of various . . . duty limitations as contemplated by
Section 6." Arguably, therefore, duty is included in the formal defi-
66. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, §§ 1-2.
67. See id. §§ 3-17.
68. See Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 2, §§ 18-23.
69. See, e.g., Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 17 cmt. h (observing that passengers may
have no duty to protect potential victims from negligence of drivers, and gun sellers may have no
duty to protect potential victims from improper use of guns).
70. Id. § 3. Section 4 defines negligence as the failure to exercise reasonable care and states
that this determination is frequently determined on a cost-benefit basis. Id. § 4 & cmt. d. Sec.
tion 5 explains the differing functions of courts and juries in negligence actions. Id. § 5.
71. Id. § 6.
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nition of the negligence cause of action, but its presence lies muffled
in a comment.
The first point of interest in Section 6 is its assertion that
duty is an issue of law exclusively for the court. Thus, it is the court
that determines the duty issue, based on "judicial recognition of
special problems" that limit the normal reach of negligence doc-
trine. While noteworthy, this aspect of duty is doctrinally noncon-
troversial, for it is hornbook law that duty involves "legal" ques-
tions for the court.72 But while this point of legal doctrine may be
noncontroversial, how broadly the courts apply the duty concept is
exceedingly controversial, for it involves the extent to which the
courts open or close their doors to particular types of plaintiffs as-
serting particular types of claims for particular types of losses. The
judge/jury aspect of Section 6 follows on the heels of the more gen-
eral treatment of this important topic in Section 5, entitled "Judge
and Jury." But Section 5 addresses the issue of when questions of
fact and combined questions of law and fact give rise to jury resolu-
tion in individual cases; whereas, Section 6 addresses duty as a
threshold doctrine excluding particular types of claims as a cate-
gorical matter in every case.7 3
The first controversial point of the Duty section (Section 6)
arises structurally from its location after the sections on Negligence
Liability (Section 3), Negligent (Section 4), and Judge and Jury
(Section 5). This order of elements contrasts quite starkly with the
conventional ordering of elements as Duty-Breach-Cause (Actual
and Proximate)-Damage, in which duty logically precedes the no-
tion of its breach. Indeed, Comment a to Section 6 acknowledges
that "courts frequently say that establishing 'duty' is the first pre-
requisite in an individual court case. . ...74
Another aspect of Section 6 that is related to the formal pri-
macy issue just mentioned springs from the statements that the
(no-) duty issue is "unusual," and "that there is a 'general duty' to
'exercise reasonable care,' to avoid subjecting others to 'an unrea-
sonable risk of harm' .... ,,75Comment a goes on to state that duty
normally is a "non-issue" that "absent unusual circumstances does
not require restatement on a case-by-case basis." 76 While all of
these assertions in themselves are largely true, their phrasing
72. Seegenerally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OpTORTS §§ 225.26 (2000).
73. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. h.





tends to diminish the significance of duty's role. In view of the fre-
quency with which courts restate duty as the first formal element
at the front of the classic definition of the negligence cause of ac-
tion, sometimes even in garden-variety accident cases, the present
formulation of Section 6 fails to convey the full extent of duty's
power.
Finally, Section 6 may suggest that judges in individual
cases have discretion to "find" that duty does or does not exist de-
pending on the particular judge's views of relevant "principles or
policy." Yet duty is neither discretionary nor a matter of fact to be
"found," but a matter which must be "ruled" upon by the court ac-
cording to the law. Certainly duty is based upon principles and pol-
icy, but the section needs to make the point that courts are bound to
search out and apply the prevailing principles and policy of the law.
B. Does the Draft Restatement Properly Restate Duty's Role in
Negligence Law?
The draft Restatement's structure and its formulation of sec-
tion 6 may be criticized, as Goldberg and Zipursky have done, for
failing to accord duty the primacy in negligence law that it occupies
in fact. More particularly, this critique faults the draft for failing to
acknowledge duty's traditional position as the formal, threshold
element of the negligence cause of action, a definitional defect that
masks duty's vital foundational role in the law of negligence. The
doctrinal basis of this critique is that, by failing to include duty in
the definition of the negligence claim, the draft fails to capture the
elements of the tort of negligence as regularly propounded by the
courts. As they have for decades, courts uniformly define the negli-
gence cause of action as including four (or five) elements: Duty-
Breach-Cause (Cause in Fact + Proximate Cause)-Damage. On this
formulation there is today virtually no debate: The courts of almost
every state consistently reiterate this standard formulation of the
negligence cause of action. 7 Thus, if the purpose of a Restatement is
to restate the law as it now stands, then it would seem that the Re-
statement (Third) should restate the law of negligence as the courts
almost universally proclaim it now to be.
Restatements, of course, have a deeper role than slavishly
parroting the most recent proclamations of doctrine from the courts.
Whether this deeper function is styled law clarification or law re-
77. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 658 n.1.
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form, restatements serve an important role in helping courts to un-
derstand the principles of law they do and should apply, and to
slough off the natural accumulation of encrusted doctrinal error.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,78 for example,
restated the basis of products liability law according to the princi-
ples of negligence, 79 rather than as a rule of "strict" liability which
courts for a generation had proclaimed.80 But the Products Liability
Restatement was justified in ignoring repeated judicial characteri-
zations of the liability rule only because the courts were doing one
thing while saying quite another: They were applying principles of
negligence while calling liability "strict." To clarify the law that
courts actually were applying, therefore, the Products Liability Re-
statement properly "restated" the law as it stood in fact, as opposed
to how it widely was described.81
There is some basis for applying such a "functional" ap-
proach (restating the law as courts do rather than as courts say) to
negligence law. The draft Restatement's characterization of duty as
a "non-issue" in most negligence cases involving physical harm in
fact is not unfair. In truth, in the vast majority of automotive acci-
dent, slip-and-fall, and other run-of-the-mill negligence cases
brought today, the defendant never challenges its duty to avoid un-
reasonably subjecting the plaintiff to a foreseeable risk of harm.
Such cases are instead defended on other elements-that the de-
fendant's conduct was not unreasonable, or that the plaintiffs dam-
ages are less than were alleged. Typically left unchallenged by the
defendant, the defendant's duty to the plaintiff is thus not ordinar-
ily put into dispute and so is not an issue in the case. In this re-
spect, the Restatement draft is correct in stating that duty is a non-
issue in many negligence cases.
8 2
The fact that the duty issue is atypical, however, does not
mean that it is not an important element, and, hence, does not
compel the conclusion that it should be excluded from the general
78. RFSrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
79. Id. § 1 cmt. a (stating that the definitions of design and warnings defects in Section 2
are based on the reasonableness test of negligence).
80. See generally David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products
Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743 (chronicling the rise and fall of strict products liability).
81. See id.
82. "Occasions for judicial determination of a duty of care are infrequent, because in 'run of
the mill' accident cases the existence of a duty may be-and usually is--safely assumed." Ray-
mond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
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definition of the negligence cause of action.8 3 Both cause in fact and
proximate cause lie typically unchallenged (and, hence, are "non-
issues") in garden-variety negligence cases, but this does not mean
that proximate causation is not a vital element in every negligence
case that properly should be restated as a necessary element in the
definition of the negligence cause of action. Like proximate causa-
tion, duty frequently lies embedded in run-of-the-mill negligence
cases; but, as with causation, the typically embedded nature of duty
does not diminish its importance as a foundational element in every
negligence case.
The essence of this critique of the Restatement draft is that it
fails to accord full-bodied recognition of duty as an explicit, manda-
tory element (indeed, the primary element) of negligence law. The
basis of this argument is that the draft is deficient because it fails
to include duty as a separate, formal element in the definition of
the negligence cause of action in Section 3, and because even Sec-
tion 6 undercuts the significance of duty by characterizing no-duty
determinations in a manner that suggests that they are largely in-
determinate and subject to the discretionary whim of every court. 84
In short, the strength of the duty element is shortchanged in the
current Restatement draft.
Criticizing the Restatement draft for embedding duty is in
some ways quite unfair, for the draft does reflect what the courts to
a large extent both do and say-which is to leave duty embedded as
a non-issue in most cases, pulling it out for consideration only in
the infrequent cases when it truly is an issue. And while duty is
indeed excluded from the Negligence-Cause-Damage recitation of
elements in Section 3, it does receive its own black-letter section
adjacent to the basic negligence sections, unlike the cause and
damage elements. 85 Moreover, the first sentence of the first com-
ment to Section 3 states that duty limitations (together with de-
fenses and immunities) are encompassed by the "subject to liability"
83. The Discussion Draft provides that the existence of a general duty to exercise reason-
able care is a "basic principle" that "absent unusual circumstances does not require restatement
on a case-by-case basis." Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. a.
84. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 660-61 (critiquing the Restatement
draft along these lines).
85. As with duties of affirmative action, draft sections on causation and damages have yet
to be circulated. However, it is likely that these sections will be located some distance from the
basic negligence and duty treatments. See Discussion Draft, supra note 1, §§ 3-6. Indeed, details
on the damages element of the negligent cause of action are likely to be addressed, if at all, out-
side of the present Restatement (Third) of Torts project. Thus, the fact that duty has its own
black-letter section so close to the core negligence sections helps compensate for its exclusion
from Section 3's black letter.
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phrase, and duty's black-letter treatment in Section 6 is there
cross-referenced. 86 Thus, while including duty in its conventional
location at the head of the classic list of negligence elements would
indeed enhance the present Restatement draft, its current formula-
tion of duty rules is not implausible.
These arguments in support of the Restatement draft not-
withstanding, the "belittling" critique has merit. As previously
mentioned, duty is the glue of interpersonal relationships in a civi-
lized society, and the existence of a right-duty relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant is the fundamental nexus that gives co-
herence to negligence claims. Benjamin Cardozo's explanation in
Palsgraf of the primacy of duty provides a coherent conceptual
foundation to negligence law that is too important to be relegated to
second-level consideration.87 The draft by no means hides the duty
element entirely from view, since duty is cross-referenced in a
comment to Section 3 and then, in Section 6, is treated in a section
of its own. But relegating such an important element to cross-
reference comment status in the section defining the negligence
cause of action undercuts the salience of the duty element. In sum,
the Restatement draft fairly may be faulted for failing to include
duty in the black-letter definition of the negligence cause of action
in Section 3.
III. CONCLUSION
Because courts and commentators in the twentieth century
failed to develop a well-defined role for duty, the current debate
over how the duty element in negligence law may best be formu-
lated in the Restatement (Third) should be very helpful to the
evolving law of torts. Because the nature of the duty concept has for
so long remained unclear, the courts have manipulated it, some-
times as an expansionary device, other times as the basis for liabil-
ity restriction, according to the political winds of the times. But
duty doctrine is too important to be left ill-defined. Critiquing the
formulation of duty rules in the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts,
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky subject the role of duty in negli-
gence law to its closest scrutiny in many years. Their inquiry has
unquestionably revivified duty's foundational significance in the
law of negligence.
86. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 3 cmt. a.
87. See ERNESTJ. NVEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 159.67 (1995).
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How the duty element may best be formulated in restating
the law of negligence may be viewed from many windows, and an
examination of the Restatement draft reveals that its present for-
mulation is broadly correct in many respects. While the draft de-
fines the negligence cause of action in general terms without ex-
plicit black-letter reference to duty, the duty/no-duty issue receives
formal black letter recognition close by. The draft Restatement's
duty section undoubtedly needs some tinkering to clarify some im-
portant points, but the duty section considered by itself is largely
sound. Yet the Restatement draft may be faulted for failing to ac-
cord duty its rightful place as an explicit element at the front of the
negligence parade.
Whether the Goldberg-Zipursky effort to move the Restate-
ment's treatment of the duty issue toward the ways of righteous-
ness will ultimately be successful is difficult to predict. My guess is
that their duty exhortations will encourage the Reporters to
strengthen the duty formulations somewhat, yet I suspect that po-
tent inertial forces will thwart any large-scale redefinitions or re-
structuring of the relevant black-letter sections. But even if this
dire prediction proves true, the prodigious efforts of Professors
Goldberg and Zipursky to alter the Restatement to reflect the pri-
macy of duty in negligence law is much more than a quixotic tilt at
an academic windmill. Courts will surely find and use the focused
Goldberg-Zipursky proposals on how duty rules may be ordered,
and on how they may be phrased.88 However duty rules may be for-
mulated in the Restatement (Third), even if they remain embedded,
chained like Prometheus to a prison rock, the present debate as-
sures that duty, the vital first principal of the law of negligence, is
now unbound. Duty rules.
88. In an Appendix to their article, Goldberg and Zipursky provide an excellent set of pro-
posals on how such principles might be formulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Goldberg
& Zipursky, supra note 3, app. at 737-51.
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